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Land value capture and urban development in Amman 
As cities grow, local governments have to make major investments in institutions and 
infrastructure. Larger cities inherently require more effective provision of public services – 
such as roads, water, sewerage, and safety – so they can become places of rising living 
standards and productive industries, as opposed to sites of crowding, congestion and 
contagious disease. As urban populations grow and investments are made in cities, 
demand for urban space is capitalised into rising land values. 
 
Policy tools such as contributions and fees are important instruments through which local 
jurisdictions can tap into these rising values – often forming a critical part of local revenue 
generation. These tools are typically applied to recoup some or all of the rise in private 
land values that arise either from public investments, for instance, in roads, public 
transport, parks etc); or from changes in regulation such as adjustments to zoning. The 
rational for this is that governments create the value and so should accrue the benefits so 
they can either finance the cost of the investment made or reinvest the gain from increased 
land values into other public goods.1 If land value capture instruments are not in place, 
then private individuals will stand to gain from the increased value without having had to 
invest in any of the costs. 
 
Capturing land values can create a virtuous cycle for cities: first it helps to raise money for 
public spending, and second, public investments which improve the city may be repaid by 
recouping a portion of nearby rising land values for the public budget. This reduced 
economic burden, is the principal advantage of value capture tools. Another appealing 
characteristic is that, when implemented properly, value capture instruments specifically 
target those who benefit from changes to land use – with their obligations typically 
reflecting the extent to which they benefit. Value capture instruments are therefore argued 
to promote greater equity, based on benefits received, than more traditional modes of 
tax and infrastructure finance, which can be deemed unfair if the costs of infrastructure 
are borne by taxpayers regardless of whether or by how much they benefit from changes 
to land. Lastly, there are considerations with relation to the improvement of efficiency. 
For example, the immovability of land arguably facilitates easier identification, valuation 
and accountability in the tax administration process. Furthermore, as a result of its fixed 
supply, taxing land should not have significant distortionary effects on investment, but 
instead, should encourage more intensive, well-planned development. 
 
Revenue from land-value capture instruments already constitutes the majority of the 
Amman’s own-source revenue. In 2018, these taxes – which include both land and 
property taxes – accounted for roughly 60% of the total JD498 million budget (≈700 million 
USD).2 However, in recent years, Amman has been struggling to keep infrastructure and 
public service delivery at pace with the needs of its rapidly expanding population. Since 
2004, Amman’s population has more than doubled from around 1.94 million people to an 
estimated 4.2 million today.3 At the same time, total urban land cover is estimated to have 
increased by more than 60%.4 If Amman continues to grow following its current patterns, 
its predicted that by 2030, land consumption could increase by 41.44km2 and that this 
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growth could cost the municipality roughly JD232 million (≈327 million USD) in 
infrastructure and JD253 million (≈356 million USD) in services.5 In order to meet the 
demands that urban growth will place on the public budget in years to come, the city will 
need to make concerted efforts to increase revenue, particularly revenue from its land. 
 
There is now a move to amend at least one of the laws that embed its land value capture 
instruments, namely the 1966 Law (No. 79) of Organizing Cities, Villages and Buildings 
(hereafter ‘Planning Law’), this presents the city with an opportunity to revise its 
instruments to be able to raise more revenue. Therefore, this analysis aims to outline some 
of the current challenges and potential opportunities that can be considered in reforming 
of the law. The focus is on the implementation of four different taxes and charges that 
Greater Amman Municipality (GAM) currently has in place as options to capture land 
value. These are mandated through a combination of the 1966 Planning Law and the 1987 
Law (No. 12) of Expropriation (hereafter ‘Expropriation Law’)ii, and include: Development 
Levies, Betterment Levies, Betterment Taxes, and Compensation Fees. 
 
As discussed in this report, the definitions and distinctions made for each of these taxes 
and charges, as well as their often-times unclear calculations, can result in confusions for 
taxpayers and administrators alike. As a result, GAM finds itself embroiled in a number of 
legal cases which cost the city valuable resources and stall urban management. This 
report draws on economic research and international experience to suggest possible 
routes through which the GAM could consider reforming these various taxes and charges, 
and thus enhance its ability to finance development in a growing city. 
 
In the following sections, the report first outlines how similar land value capture 
instruments are defined and used in standard practice across the world. It then describes 
the various land financing instruments currently used in Amman and how these relate to 
practices internationally. The final section of the report details three potential pillars of 
reform that can be considered in the upcoming revision of the 1966 Planning Law, namely: 
(i) assessment and calculation, (ii) issuance, and (iii) collection. 
 
Different land value capture instruments 
There are a variety of different options to capture land value, which are at the disposal of 
municipal governments. Based on the current practices in GAM as well as the desired 
directions of change, this report will focus only on four specific types, namely land value 
increment taxes, betterment levies, development impact fees and exactions. The 
first instrument relates to increases in land values that arise as a result of public policy 
changes; whereas the last three relate specifically to public infrastructure investments. 
 
 
 
 
ii NB: This law has recently been superseded on July 1st 2019 by the Real Estate and Property Law. This 
new 2019 law has incorporated most articles from the previous 1987 Expropriation Law, including the one 
on Betterment Levies, which is still the one referred to as well as further discussed in this report. 
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Table 1 provides a basic overview of these instruments and their characteristics. It is 
important to note that these taxes are typically supplementary to a city’s property tax, with 
the property tax itself being one of the most fundamental forms of land value capture in 
any city. Although the property tax is not the focus of this policy report, many of the 
recommendations for the other instruments we discuss are also applicable to it. For a 
more specific and detailed discussion on common property tax opportunities and 
challenges as well as approaches used, we refer the reader to an IGC policy paper entitled 
“Land and property taxes for municipal finance”.6 
 
Table 1: Land value capture instruments and characteristics 
 
Instrument 
Type of 
Charge 
For What Who Pays When (usually) Examples 
 
Land Value 
Increment 
Taxiii 
 
 
Tax 
 
Increased value as a 
result of public action 
(e.g. zoning) 
 
Landowners (for 
reinvestment into 
public benefit) 
Either on a fixed- 
frequency basis 
(e.g. yearly) or at 
the time of 
transfer. 
 
 
Taiwaniv, v 
 
 
Betterment 
Levy 
 
 
Tax or Fee 
 
Increased value as a 
result of public 
investment (e.g. 
construction of a road) 
Land or property 
owners in a pre- 
specified area of 
influence based on 
the gains they have 
accrued 
 
After completion 
of project within 
a bounded time 
period 
 
 
Bogota, 
Colombiavi 
 
Development 
Impact Fee 
 
Fee 
(Monetary) 
Cover the cost of 
additional 
infrastructure and 
services as a result of 
a development 
 
 
Developer 
 
One time, 
upfront charge 
 
 
Hong Kongvii 
 
 
Exaction 
 
 
Fee (Non- 
Monetary) 
In-kind contribution 
linked to the cost of 
additional 
infrastructure and 
services as a result of 
a development 
 
 
Developer 
 
One time, 
upfront 
contribution 
 
 
Medellin, 
Colombiaviii 
Land value increment taxes 
Local governments can create value when they change or adopt new land use 
management plans for urbanisation. This is typically done through zoning or re-zoning. 
Generally speaking, when a property owner or developer wishes to use land in a way that 
is not permitted by current zoning regulations, they must request their municipality to 
 
iii We use the term Land Value Increment Tax, as used by Walter (2016) and others, to describe taxes based 
on increases in value that are driven by public administration changes. These should be distinguished from 
Tax Increment Financing, which is different and a commonly used tool in the US, typically involving the 
diversion of property taxes from one area to subsidise infrastructure redevelopment projects. 
iv See Case Studies 1a and 3 for further details 
v Another form of a land value increment tax, are Certificates of Additional Construction Potential Bonds 
(CEPACs) which have been successfully used in São Paolo, Brazil. For more details, see this link. 
vi See Case Study 1b for further details. 
vii See Amirtahmasebi et al (2016) for further details. 
viii See Case Study 2 for further details 
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Case Study 1a: Colombia’s Land Value Increment Taxes8 
 
In 1997, the government administered a law which further requires local governments to adopt 
a land value increment tax, plusvalías (capital gain sharing) as one of the main sources of income 
when they make new zoning plans. 
 
The key of the plusvalías is that it covers government actions that are not directly tied to fiscal 
costs from public investment projects, but rather gains in real estate prices associated with 
administrative changes, particularly from (re)zoning. The taxable value for plusvalías is 
calculated on the difference in the land value before and after the approved change and charged 
to landowners. Local governments are then required to capture between 30-50 percent of this 
increased value. This revenue is intended to help cover the cost of public projects which other 
taxes, such as betterment contributions or the annual property taxes, do not finance. However, 
the implementation of the plusvalías has had several challenges associated with calculating 
changes in land values.9 It was not until 2004 that Bogotá began to see any revenue from this 
source, and even since, it has only generating around USD 6 million per year by 2009, roughly 
equivalent to 0.35 percent of Bogota’s own-source revenue.10 
reclassify the land so that it permits the desired use. This can happen if developers come 
with new planning proposals for land that is either deemed of a different use or for land 
that does not yet fall within the masterplan but has to become included to be developed. 
Rezoning may also happen to adjust regulations over permitted densities for existing land, 
which can be modified to accommodate new growth. 
 
Since (re)zoning creates new opportunities for how land can best be used, it can invigorate 
rising demand and value over that land. Moreover, because the power of (re)zoning is one 
that solely lies with government, any increases in value created by the government 
through (re)zoning should therefore be attributed to the government rather than any 
private provider. For that reason, land value increment taxes should be imposed on 
landowners, as they are the direct recipient of the increased value through no efforts of 
their own, and the revenues should then be reinvested for the public’s benefit. 
 
There are two main features of land value increment taxes that make them unique. First, 
they are defined as a tax (as opposed to a charge or a fee) as they are not tied to the 
recovery of costs for specific infrastructure or service improvements. Second, they differ 
from several other standard land value capture instruments because they should only be 
associated with the increment in land value, and not the full value of land and buildings, 
where any increases in the value of physical structures tend to reflect private rather than 
public investment. These differences are illustrated in the case study of Colombia’s 
plusvalías tax (see Case Study 1a).7 
 
Betterment levies 
Unlike the land value increment tax, a betterment levy can be a tax or a fee that is levied 
on land and property owners. It is based on the gains accrued in land value as a result of 
a public investment, for example in road infrastructure. Betterment levies place a 
supplementary tax in a specified area around a public infrastructure improvement. The 
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Case Study 1b: Colombia’s Betterment Levies 11 
 
Colombian cities have often been revered for their success in land value capture. Perhaps most 
famously, a form of betterment levy called the contribución de valorización has been collected, 
since 1921, from property owners to finance urban infrastructure. 
 
The contribución de valorización is calculated in different ways in different cities in Colombia, but 
in all cases is charged to all property owners in a pre-determined area of influence, which in turn 
is based on factors such as accessibility to the infrastructure investment. Some of the cities, like 
the capital Bogota, solely consider the cost of the construction of the public infrastructure, and 
then divide this by the number of property owners deemed to be in the area of influence. Other 
cities, like Medellin, also take into account the value of property before and after the public 
infrastructure investment is completed, determined by dedicated surveys, amongst other factors. 
In both cases, the period of paying the levy is no longer than 5 years. This has been an extremely 
successful levy and has funded about 1 billion USD in public works since it was first introduced. 
levy can be calculated and charged based on an overall increase in land value, as a tax, 
or, as is the case in Columbia (see Case Study 1b), it can distribute the costs of 
construction of the infrastructure amongst those that benefit from it, as a fee. 
 
 
In theory, with a well-functioning property tax, the betterment levy would not be necessary, 
as the increment in land values from the investment would be reflected in the assessment 
base and then captured in the property tax. This is why betterment levies are often 
considered supplementary to the property tax or in place of it when the property tax 
functions poorly. In many cities, betterment levies are like special assessments, placing a 
supplementary tax rate on the property tax in a specified area around the infrastructure. 
Development levies: impact fees and exactions 
Each new development brings with it an increased load on the local government – in terms 
of essential infrastructure, including roads, schools, water and utilities – that are needed 
to service the land to make it both liveable and productive. These infrastructure 
developments increase the value of land and therefore, a government may expect 
developers to pay or make equivalent in-kind contributions to cover these costs. The 
developers, in turn, may pass on these costs to buyers or renters of the properties, who 
ultimately created the need for the infrastructure investments. However, if there is no 
specific way to have the developer pay, the costs would have to be recouped in the form 
of taxes from the general public who may not derive any benefit from these new 
investments and therefore should not bear the costs. 
 
Development levies are typically applied in one of two ways, either as impact fees or 
exactions: 
 
• Impact Fees are one-time, up-front charges applied by a government agency to a 
private developer in connection with the approval of a project. The purpose of the 
fee is to finance either all, or at least a portion, of the capital costs of public facilities 
that are needed to ultimately serve the developed piece of land. Developers are 
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Case Study 2: Exactions in Medellin, Colombia 
 
There has been widespread construction and redevelopment of Medellin over the last few 
decades as population growth has driven increased competition for space in the city. To meet 
some of the demands this urban growth places on public infrastructure and services, the 
government has made regular use of developer exactions, often described as “urban transfer 
obligations” in Colombia. 
 
Medellin’s exaction process requires that new developments transfer a certain portion of land to 
the city for public purposes. The exact amount varies depending on the location and size of the 
development, as well as a number of other parameters, that are examined for each given project. 
In cases where it is not possible to transfer land to the city, the obligation can be met through a 
cash-equivalent payment instead, where the proceeds are earmarked for the creation of public 
typically required to pay impact fees for new construction as well as 
redevelopments and renovations that alter building rights and/or regulations. 
 
• Exactions are similar to impact fees in that they require developers to make 
contributions in order to develop a piece of land. However, in this case the 
contributions are for a specific purpose and can be either in cash or in-kind, such 
as dedicating land for public facilities or installing utility connections.12 The 
applicant will receive the right to develop a piece of land but has to either make 
provisions for accompanying public land or make a payment to be used for certain 
public infrastructure that will serve the development.13 
 
Both impact fees and exactions have to meet the so-called rational nexus test:14 there has 
to be proof that the new development(s) will require new infrastructure; the fee or exaction 
has to be directly proportional to the size of development; it needs to be of a reasonable 
magnitude for the developer to pay; and there needs to be a direct link to the development 
itself. Both are, in principle, a form of taxation applied directly to the developers of 
residential and commercial property. 
 
In many cases, it may be that development levies are able to spur private investment as 
they allow for improvements to existing neighbourhoods.15 For example, impact fees have 
been successfully used in vibrant real estate markets, like in Hong Kong, to finance a large 
volume of public infrastructure.16 In the UK, the government uses the Community 
Infrastructure Levy as the preferred means of collecting developer contributions to public 
investments. These charges are applied to residential and commercial construction and 
have become increasingly important for local revenue generation, growing from an 
average of £0.2m per charging authority in 2012 to £2m in 2014.17 However, in other 
cases, impact fees may be difficult to calculate and may have some disincentivising effects 
if implemented in places that do not have thriving real estate markets. Therefore, exactions 
(see Case Study 2) may be more suitable for contexts where the exact costs of new 
infrastructure cannot be established or where the applied charge can be negotiated on a 
case by case basis. 
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Linking the instrument to the use case 
It is important to distinguish the difference between land value capture related to changes 
in policy – as in the case of land value increment taxes – versus those associated with 
public infrastructure investments – as in the case of betterment levies, impact fees and 
exactions. The corresponding increases in land values are different in nature and therefore 
need to be handled differently. 
 
Policy changes to zoning and building regulations warrant land value capture because 
they grant landowners the opportunity for higher economic rents – for instance, through 
increasing the size and density of their developments. This gives the landowner a windfall 
gain, for which, the municipality may expect to take some portion for the public benefit. 
There are several reasons why the municipality will want to do this: 
 
1. To cover any administrative fees associated with staff costs and bureaucratic or 
legal procedures that are needed to conduct the policy change; 
2. To fund future infrastructure to serve denser developments; 
3. To compensate those who will be negatively affected by dense development; 
4. To share the publicly generated wealth with the city at large; 
 
The second and third points, in particular, may be needed if the expectation is that the 
landowner will respond to looser zoning or building restrictions by increasing the density 
of their developments. 
space elsewhere. In all cases, the land or money must be released to the city before the 
development can be formally approved. 
 
A set of defined formulas are used to calculate the appropriate land transfer for residential and 
commercial projects as follows: 
 
- Residential use land transfer = (Number of proposed households in new 
development × Average household size in the area) × Pre-defined Land transfer 
requirements per inhabitant in the area 
 
- Commercial use land transfer = Total area to be built in proposed development × 
Pre-defined land transfer obligations per m2 of development in area 
 
In both cases, further land must be devoted to public facilities and added to the total exaction 
requirement according to the following obligations: 1m2 for every proposed new household in 
residential developments and 1m2 per every 100m2 of commercial development. 
 
Exactions have proved extremely successful in Medellin, between 2006 and 2011, the city 
brought in on average USD 11.7 million annually in cash payments from developer exactions, 
on top of any actual physical land that was transferred to the city. Information on land transfers 
is less updated and therefore harder to quantify, however, the cash payments alone are a 
significant contribution to public space and facilities funding and notably almost double the 
revenue take from Bogota’s plusvalías tax (described in Case Study 1a), despite being a much 
smaller city. 
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The rationales for value capture related to infrastructure investment are similar, however, 
there is an important distinction related to their implementation, namely that there should 
be an explicit link to the construction of tangible infrastructure. For example, in the case 
of a betterment levy, the link is to the government’s investment in public infrastructure, 
while in the case of an impact fee or exaction, the developer has applied to undertake new 
construction, which will require further public infrastructure and services. The exact 
increase in land value arising from the infrastructure investments may be challenging to 
calculate, however, it can be estimated using the costs of the actual investment itself. In 
particular, the city should know what it has spent on public infrastructure such as roads, 
water mains, or electricity. It can then extrapolate the commensurate requirements and 
expected costs, for a given proposed development and use this value to calculate the 
impact fee or exaction. 
 
Amman’s land value capture instruments 
As noted, the 1966 Planning Law has a number of provisions for land value capture 
instruments, which is a useful foundation for GAM to build upon in its potential reforms. In 
particular, it provides for the following: 
Development Levies (Chapter VII): In the Planning Law there are provisions for two 
forms of development levies, termed ‘general’ and ‘special’ development levies. The 
fundamental difference between the two is who authorises them: General development 
levies are implemented following decisions of the Supreme Planning Council, whereas 
Special Development Levies are decided by the Provincial or Local Planning Committees. 
According to the Planning Law, the revenues from the levies are used to cover the capital 
expenses of a particular public or private project. Based on their respective descriptions 
in the law, these levies fall somewhere on the spectrum of how development impact fees 
and betterment levies are used in international practice – as described in the previous 
section. However, as outlined in further detail below, since the Planning Law also has 
other, more specific and clear provisions for betterment levies, it is likely that those who 
drafted the law added a separate provision for these development levies in order to have 
an instrument that could operate in a similar manner to development impact fees, as used 
internationally. This lack of clarity, however, is likely to be one of the main reasons 
hindering its implementation. 
 
If Amman’s development levies are supposed to fulfil similar functions to the development 
impact fee, then it is important to note that there are clear differences between the current 
set-up and how development impact fees are used in practice elsewhere. In particular, the 
Planning Law stipulates that both the ‘general’ and ‘special’ development levies should be 
charged to land or property owners, but for development impact fees, these should 
realistically always be charged directly to the developer. Yet, it cannot automatically be 
assumed that the developer is the same as the land or property owner; they may, for 
example, be leasing the land for a specified period of time on which they develop the 
property. A further difference between impact fees as they are conceived and the 
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development levies currently set out in the law, is that as per the 1966 Planning Law, 
development levies are calculated by taking the difference between the value of land 
before and after the development, as well as taking into account pertinent features such 
as the area of the property under consideration and whether it has a front facing façade. 
Yet, for development impact fees the rate should be directly linked to, and therefore 
calculated based on, the estimated expenses that occurred as a result of the development, 
as opposed to land values. The law does, however, specify in Article 53, the fact that the 
payments should be one-off or in equivalent instalments over a maximum period of a year, 
which are akin to impact fees. However, it is not clear whether the payments envisaged 
by the law are ex-ante or ex-post; if the development levies are meant to function more 
like impact fees then the law should clearly outline the payment needs to be upfront. 
Betterment Levies (Article 54): As for the definition of betterment levies provided in the 
section on land value capture instruments in the 1966 Planning Law, the Betterment 
Levies entail a one-off charge levied on land located in a specified area of influence, that 
has increased in value as a result of a public investment. They are calculated as follows: 
• For land within 500m of the investment: 20% of the value of the land price 
difference (based on the estimated sales price) before and after the project; 
• For land within 1000m of the investment: 10% of the value of the land price 
difference (based on the estimated sales price) before and after the project. 
For the betterment levies, the law also makes provisions for an earmarked budget line for 
the revenues to be paid into. We discuss some of the benefits of earmarking funds later 
on in this report. Moreover, Article 54.5, where this provision is stipulated, further notes 
that the revenues from these levies are meant to cover the costs of land expropriation 
required for future public investment and associated compensations, as well as any other 
costs of construction. 
 
It is important to note that the 1987 Expropriation Law also has provisions for betterment 
taxes (Article 24). According to this law, the betterment tax is specifically charged following 
an official expropriation of land that was for the purpose of the construction of a new road 
or the expansion of road space. It is charged on property owners (including both those 
who own land and buildings) directly affected by the road space and it can be up to 25% 
of the amount of the overall appreciation of the land. This tax is specifically payable in four 
equal instalments over four years (Article 24.4C). As will be discussed in the next section 
of this report, the fact that there are stipulations for betterment charges in two different 
laws, which are further associated with different calculations, may contribute to confusion 
amongst administrators as well as payers of these taxes. 
 
Compensation Fees (Article 47 & 48): Although the development and betterment levies 
are very clearly specified in the 1966 Planning Law, GAM has had major challenges in 
their implementation. In the past, these levies have been subject to a number of court 
cases, the majority of which GAM has lost. This is as a result of the difficulties faced in 
attempting to calculate the appropriate fee to be paid with these taxes. Calculations should 
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be based on the value of investments made on land and the resulting increases in land 
value; however, GAM does not have clear ways of recording their investment costs and 
apportioning the tax obligations accordingly. In turn, this makes it difficult to transparently 
link these investment expenses to potential increases in land value. As a result, these 
aspects of the calculation have been highly contested and GAM has not been able to 
implement levies in most of the city. The only area where the levies have been successfully 
implemented are in Area C, the highest density area of the city, due to their being more 
detailed information on investment costs available. 
 
For all other parts of the city therefore, GAM has had to find other ways of raising revenue. 
To do this they have established a so-called compensation fee, which relies on an 
interpretation of Article 47 and 48 of the 1966 Planning Law. In particular, Article 47 of the 
1966 Law, outlines that when GAM implements a development decision that results in a 
fall in land value – for example restricting height regulations where they had previously 
been more permissive – then GAM needs to pay the landowner compensation for the lost 
value. Through a backward induction interpretation of this, GAM has now established the 
compensation fee, which entails a situation where developers and landowners have to 
pay GAM as a result of so-called “extra development rights” that they request and that, if 
granted, will increase the value of their land. 
 
The nature of these “extra development rights” have been established through a similar 
backward induction interpretation but this time from Article 48. In particular, Article 48 
outlines in which cases the landowner will not receive compensation from GAM; from this 
GAM has then established where they can charge compensation fees to developers. 
These are in three main cases, namely: 
• When developers ask for increased building rights: In this case, the land being 
developed is already part of the municipality’s formal zoning plan, which means it 
is serviced by government infrastructure or at least is expected to be serviced in 
the future. Private developers are obligated to pay the charge to the General 
Planning Department before they can be granted additional building rights. 
• When land is to be re-zoned: Again, these areas are already part of the municipal 
service plan, but increases in land value are principally driven by an administrative 
change which affects market conditions as opposed to hard infrastructure 
improvements. The charge is directed towards private landowners and allows the 
municipality to capture the increased value that is derived from the government- 
driven land use change. 
• When developers want unzoned land to become zoned: This charge occurs when 
the land is not already part of the masterplan. Land values will increase simply 
from the administrative change of being integrated into the formal masterplan, 
hence, warranting land value increment taxes. Furthermore, once land becomes 
zoned, it is entered into the municipal service plan, meaning that at some stage 
new infrastructure will need to be put in place to support the development. 
13  
Interestingly, although the compensation fee is based on the interpretation of the law, 
rather than the actual law itself, it is still more widely accepted and thus far less contested, 
than the levies that are clearly stipulated in the law. 
 
With the exposition given above of the different land value capture instruments that are 
defined by law in Amman, the following section will discuss some of the key challenges 
associated with implementing these instruments in practice and how these challenges 
reveal opportunities where the government could reform its use of land value capture. 
Overall challenges 
One of the biggest challenges facing Amman is to make taxation politically acceptable. In 
a recent survey of Jordanian public opinion, just 7% of respondents said that they would 
support the government levying new taxes in order to improve basic services such as 
health care, education and infrastructure.18 Of the 89% that responded in opposition, 70% 
cited affordability concerns, whilst 12% said that with current service provision being so 
poor, they had very little expectation that the government could improve the situation even 
with a higher tax take.19 
 
This sentiment underscores some important elements that will determine the effectiveness 
of each of these taxes and fees. First, taxation has to be built on strong administrative 
foundations to ensure charges are calculated appropriately. Second, the issuance and 
payment process should not be too cumbersome for taxpayers so as to undermine the 
ease of compliance and the legitimacy of the system. Lastly, it is essential that local 
governments can effectively communicate the benefits of paying tax by demonstrating its 
link to the provision of better infrastructure and services. 
 
In the following section of the report we will focus on the challenges related to the 
compensation fees, and also highlight three key areas where the GAM could improve 
revenue in-take from this instrument by: 
 
• Unbundling charges: to improve transparency through better assessments of 
obligations; 
• Improving calculation: through appropriate valuation and fee rates; 
• Increasing collection: by enhancing tax compliance. 
 
 
Considerations for reform 
Unbundling charges: who is being taxed for what, when and how? 
Tax assessments and obligations 
The 1966 Planning Law is actually quite comprehensive in terms of the levies it allows, 
which have been summarised in Table 2. However, in its current formulation three main 
challenges arise: implementation, target, and timing. 
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Implementation: 
 
Key message: The decision to use compensation fees in place of other levies has 
contributed to complications and overlaps between different charges across different 
laws. Each case has unique implications for what should be charged, who should be 
responsible for the obligation, and when the payment should be due. As such, they 
require specific and distinct tools for land value capture to address them. 
Due to the challenges of calculating Development Levies and Betterment Levies, these 
are not implemented in practice outside of Area C, resulting in huge lost opportunity for 
GAM. To cover for this loss of revenue, GAM has defined a compensation fee, which is 
based on an interpretation of the 1966 Planning Law, rather than enumerated directly in 
the Law itself. This has resulted in a number of overlaps between different charges across 
different laws (e.g. with the 1987 Expropriation Law) as well as within the 1966 Planning 
Law itself. In particular, the compensation fee can be applied under most of the cases for 
which there are other instruments in the Planning Law that fulfil the same role. This not 
only adds to the confusion of implementing and collecting the charge, but it prevents the 
municipality from leveraging the separate advantages of each policy tool it has defined in 
its laws. 
Target: 
 
Key message: Different stakeholders should be responsible for paying depending 
on what each of the different fees are trying to achieve, such as whether the aim is 
to capture land value increases generated by public investments or to cover the 
public expenses incurred as a result of new developments or to capture increased 
land values from policy changes. 
 
In particular, if the purpose of development levies, as the law implies, is to cover the 
expenses of development, then it may be preferable for the obligation of payment to 
accrue to private developers, whether they are homebuilders or commercial real estate 
developers, as highlighted in the section on Development fees and exactions. This is 
because their actions are directly resulting in increased costs for the municipality itself to 
provide infrastructure and services to the land. These extra investments, in turn, will 
increase the overall land value, making it appropriate for the municipality to recoup the 
costs. As noted this can be done by having developers pay a monetary fee, in the form of 
an impact fee, or by making an in-kind contribution, in the form of an exaction, as 
highlighted in Case Study 2. 
 
In cases where the value of land rises as a result of administrative changes, however, 
landowners should be responsible for paying the tax, as the value is publicly created. Here 
the law should clearly stipulate how the charge should be paid by the landowner: this may 
be done as in current practice when they make a request for land to be rezoned, or the 
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municipality may also want to consider applying the tax on a fixed-rate basis or at the time 
of transfer of properties as in the case of Taiwan (see Case Study 3). The latter requires 
more effective valuation of properties and may prolong the receipt of payments to the 
municipality, however, it could also ease the coordination of LVIT with other property taxes 
in the city and prevent taxes from being imposed on landowners too early, i.e. before they 
have seen reasonable increases in their land values. 
 
Unlike the other taxes and levies in the law, given the 1966 Planning Law does not clearly 
define the compensation fees charged by GAM, it also does not clearly define who pays. 
For ease of administration and payment, GAM has applied this for when developers 
request their “extra development rights” from the Planning Department. To receive 
approval of their request, they also sign a binding document directly with GAM to say they 
will pay the compensation fee. However, given that this provision is not written directly in 
law, this is a potential area that GAM could potentially face legal challenges in the future. 
Therefore, if they want to keep and build on the practice of compensation fees for extra 
development rights, it will be in GAM’s interest to ensure these current practices are clearly 
enshrined in the revisions of the 1966 Planning Law. 
Furthermore, because the current practice states that landowners can be charged the 
compensation fee as well, this may cause further challenges in the cases related to 
unzoned lands because these are areas in Amman where people have settled with unclear 
ownership rights and poorly defined boundaries delineating their plots from those of 
others. This makes it very hard to properly record properties and determine who owns 
what land and therefore who is liable to pay. This means a large share of properties may 
be missed, while others could be given unsuitable charges, ultimately leading to neglected 
payments and disputes, even when targeting landowners. 
Timing: 
 
Key message: Payment should also occur at different times depending on the type 
of levy. Ensuring that these respective value capture instruments are applied at the 
appropriate time can make them more politically acceptable. 
Although the 1966 Planning Law is clear about the timing for some of the levies, for others 
this is left unclear. For example, just as the burden of development levies and land value 
increment taxes should be applied to different economic agents, they should also be 
applied at different times. For development levies, the costs need to be made upfront on 
a one-time basis so they can contribute directly towards the impact of a development and 
its immediate pressure on infrastructure needs. However, with land value increments or 
betterment levies, that are associated with public actions such as (re)zoning or public 
investments, these can be charged at the time of property transfer, or even on a recurring 
basis, within a specified period of time of the impact, as and when land values rise. As the 
example of Colombia outlined in Case Study 1a shows, the charging of the betterment 
levy (contribución de valorización) cannot extend beyond 5 years. All of these factors on 
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payment should be outlined clearly in law to make it transparent who the targeted tax 
payers are as well as their proposed payment schedules. 
Simplified and more transparent calculations 
 
Key message: The legitimacy of the calculated fee hinges on whether land is 
appropriately valued and whether the tax rate applied is deemed fair. 
The 1966 Planning Law outlines the calculation for most of the taxes and levies it 
stipulates. The one major exception is the calculation of the compensation fee, which is 
currently calculated based on an interpretation of the 1966 Planning Law by the 
Comprehensive Planning Department and using a formula from the previously valid 1987 
Expropriation Law. As per current practice, it is calculated in a four-stage process as 
follows: 
 
1. Determining a base land value (adjusted land value). This is a base that takes into 
account the location of the land (e.g. neighbourhood), the type of the proposed 
development and the quality of the proposed development. This base land value 
is updated according to the proposed development; 
2. Determining the value of land before and after development/(re)zoning: the land 
prices would ideally come from sales prices, however, as these are not always 
readily available, this is done by the GAM’s Department for Land and Surveys as 
described in the next section. 
3. Adjusting this by a factor of 25%. This is a reference value which has been adopted 
from the betterment tax in the 1987 Expropriation Law which stipulates you cannot 
charge over a quarter. 
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶" = $𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵" − 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵123435678 ∗ 0.25 
 
which is to say, a 25% fee is applied to the difference in the base land values at time 𝑡𝑡 
versus the original, i.e before the new building rights permissions or government-granted 
land use changes occur. Clearly, we can see that based on the parameters included in 
the calculating equation, the validity of the compensation fee – as well as the other taxes 
and levies outlined in the Planning Law for that matter – is predicated on other factors 
such as: (i) whether the valuation of land is legitimate, and (ii) whether the rate applied to 
the equation is considered fair. 
 
Valuing land 
Key message: Given that calculations for the levies and the compensation fee are 
based on changes in land value, frequent and accurate land valuations are 
essential for fair and efficient revenue generation. 
 
Under the 1927 Land Demarcation and Valuation Law (hereafter referred to as the 1927 
Law), the Department for Land and Surveys has full responsibility for valuing land and 
property in Jordan.20 This information is then fed into other departments that are in charge 
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of calculating tax bills based on these values. One of the main issues for agencies like the 
General Planning Department, is that land and property valuations can often be 
inaccurate. As a consequence, their tax bills are destined to be imprecise due to the data 
they receive. 
 
One of the principal issues with the current valuation approach is that the Land and 
Surveys Department only calculates average values across quite large enumeration 
areas. This process is derived from some of the earliest fiscal surveys implemented in 
Jordan shortly after the 1927 Law was passed. However, at this time the population was 
predominantly rural and the state had not yet determined who owned what land. 
Therefore, it was easier to divide the population by fiscal blocks, called quarters in cities 
and hawds in rural areas, because there was very little variation in land characteristics 
within these areas.21 Now that Jordan is heavily urbanised, it is problematic that the 
individual plot is not the unit of observation, as average values are likely to neglect 
significant variations in local neighbourhood characteristics. 
 
Another issue is that valuations tend to be infrequent. This decreases the legitimacy of the 
tax for two reasons: first, it means the original land values used are often based on 
outdated estimates; second, it makes it harder to generate accurate predictions of how 
land values might change following any rezoning or infrastructure instalments. These 
issues highlight the trade-offs between greater accuracy and greater simplicity that all 
municipalities face when valuing land and property more generallyix. Although the General 
Planning Department has little control over the valuation data they receive, this information 
is relevant because it may suggest alternative options that national authorities could be 
encouraged to consider. 
 
Taiwan has successfully managed to overcome this by developing a system of land 
valuation that is updated on the 1st of January every year. This system of calculating land 
values, outlined in Case Study 3, is also outlined on the government website and thus 
accessible to everyone. The Taiwanese case further demonstrates that land value 
increments can be successfully separated from other property taxes, such as development 
levies, through a one-time tax at the time of land transfer. A key foundation to the system’s 
effectiveness is that land registration is efficient and the government undertakes 
consistent revaluation of land and property. 
 
There are other methods for land valuation that could be considered. For example, many 
developed countries use market value assessment to value land or property, based either 
on the sales price of comparable plots or the estimated rent. Yet this may not be feasible 
for a city like Amman, where the data may not be available. New approaches are 
consistently being developed that could be more suitable; for instance, recent research 
has shown that spatial modelling may sometimes actually outperform typical market value 
 
ix We refer the reader to an IGC policy paper on Land and property taxes for municipal finances, for a 
comprehensive review of common valuation approaches – such as market, points/proxy, area and 
construction-based valuation – and their associated trade-offs. 
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approaches with less data.22 Moreover, these models can combine very basic property 
information, such as the area, age and location of a property, with other GIS data that is 
readily available from government or secondary sources, such as land quality, disposable 
income or air pollution, to enrich the information available and increase valuation 
performance, at little or no additional cost. 
 
Case Study 3: Assessing Land Value in Taiwan23 
 
Taiwan is one of the most successful countries in the Asia region for land value capture.24 One 
of the features that makes the Taiwanese land tax system unique is that a land value increment 
tax (LVIT) is embedded in its national constitution. The LVIT has actually shown very effective 
revenue potential in Taiwan, averaging a combined revenue of 1.6% of GDP since 2000, which 
by international standards is extremely respectable.25 
 
Each year, the local government provides a value for each parcel of land in its jurisdiction. If a 
parcel is transferred through regular sale, the valuation department updates their record for the 
price of the parcel of land at the time of sale. If a parcel is never transferred, then the government 
assessment is used as the reference value. In order to prevent underreporting of sales 
transactions, the law stipulates that if the assed sales price of the parcel is lower than the 
government assessment, then the government is allowed to purchase the parcel at the sales 
price. 
 
To calculate the land value increment tax (LVIT), the government takes the difference between 
the original value of land and the current value of land, adjusting it for inflation and deducting 
any improvement costs or taxes that have been paid: 
 
LVICT = Tax rate x (((Current Value of Land – Original Value of Land) x (Current Consumer 
Price Index)) – (Land Improvement Costs)) 
Where: 
• Current Value: 
• Total contract price current sales agreement OR 
• Land value released by government x acreage 
• Previous Value: 
• Total contract price last sales agreement OR 
• Original value set by government x acreage 
• Land Improvements: cost of improvements, development impact fee paid, cost of 
rezoning, land donated, public facilities, fees for rezoning 
• Reductions based on how long previous owner held land 
 
The tax rates applied vary based on the size of the calculated land value increment with relation 
to the original value of land: 
• 20% if it is <100 % of previous value 
• 30% if it is 100-200% of previous value 
• 40% if it is >200% of previous value 
 
There are obvious data challenges associated with land valuation in Amman. These are 
important issues to address in order to improve the general functioning of the land and 
property tax system. However, other forms of data, such as expenditure data, will also be 
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needed for the implementation of value capture instruments that are based on 
infrastructure investments, such as development levies. Given the aforementioned 
weaknesses in land valuation, GAM may find it easier, in the short term, to improve its 
collection of accurate expenditure data since these costs are under their supervision and 
control as they relate to specific projects the municipality takes on. We discuss this further 
in the following section. 
 
Calculating the rate 
Key Message: A further consideration for GAM is whether the applied tax rate of 
25% for the compensation fee and 20% or 10% for the betterment levy formula, is 
justifiable. 
 
Particularly in the case of the compensation fee, the 25% rate seems to only have been 
chosen for the fact that it is a reference value in the 1987 Expropriation Law. All of these 
rates may be perceived to be high and thus potentially one of the reasons for the low 
payment compliance and large number of contending court cases. At present, because 
there is no calculation enshrined in law for the compensation fees, it also means that with 
current practice charges are levied in an informal and ad-hoc manner which allows 
developers to negotiate the tariff applied by GAM and it is then often reduced for those 
who resist most fervently. 
 
On one hand, charging a flat tariff rate, as is currently done with the 10%, 20% or 25% 
rate, may be more reasonable in the cases where the charge is applied for rezoning land. 
Here the rationale of the charge is to capture a portion of the increased value associated 
with changes in administration of the land. However, it’s important to note that this does 
not negate the fact that there is currently no strong legal or planning justification for why 
the rate of 25% is applied. 
 
On the other hand, when the compensation fee is used to cover the infrastructure costs of 
a development, a flat tariff rate will not meet the rational nexus test (as described in the 
section on Development fees and exactions) because the fee is not proportional to the 
size of the development or its infrastructure implications. Therefore, given that the current 
Planning Law does not specify a rate, this is an opportunity to leverage the new drafting 
of the law to clarify the calculation as well as the rates, and thus the tax payer’s perception 
and payment of the tax. It should be emphasised that the reforms in calculation will have 
to be closely linked to the reforms around Unbundling charges. 
 
As already noted, many municipalities with land value capture instruments that are meant 
to recoup the costs of public investments, such as development impact fees or exactions, 
closely tie these to the predicted public infrastructure costs of the development. Doing this 
requires effective current and future planning statistics in order to, for example, evaluate 
the existing infrastructure situation, how communities will grow as a result of new 
construction, and thus what the commensurate infrastructure and service growth will need 
to be. This information is then integrated into capital improvement plans which detail the 
20  
Case Study 4: Communicating the link between tax and infrastructure in Lagos28 
 
In the 1990s, Lagos, the capital city of Nigeria, was internationally renowned for corruption, 
weak public infrastructure, low tax compliance, and an over-reliance on oil revenues. With the 
advent of democracy in 1999, Governor Fashola was elected Governor of Lagos State on a 
platform of tax reform and infrastructure delivery. 
 
Increasing property tax revenues were spent on highly  visible and popular infrastructure,  
such as roads. This was based on extensive public consultations revealing that, as one of the 
world’s most congested cities of the time, roads were the most pressing issue requiring state 
government attention. At the same time, the state government used innovative  
communication practices to demonstrate to citizens that roads could not have been built 
without their tax contributions. 
projects needed to service anticipated growth, as well as their associated descriptions, 
cost estimates, schedule and location.26 Having a well-defined capital improvement plan, 
therefore, is not only critical for communicating the link between the charge and its 
infrastructure outcomes, which we discuss in more detail later, but it also allows the 
municipality to assess whether its charge is appropriate for the infrastructure needs of the 
local area. 
Improving collection by linking payments to better infrastructure and services 
 
Key Message: Taxpayers have the right to know what their contributions are going 
towards. Once they can see tangible outcomes that are related to their tax and fee 
payments, the number of contestations with regards to payment may decrease. 
 
At present, the compensation fee is often contested, renegotiated or avoided; and this 
problem is particularly acute when it is applied to unzoned land as these areas are not 
part of the infrastructure and service plan already so there is less salience over what the 
government will offer in return for the payment of the charge. Therefore, in addition to the 
revision of the law, GAM may also consider a policy around public communications as a 
means to foster a more positive image of the charge, as well as the other taxes and levies 
enshrined in the law, that could encourage citizens to recognise it as a social obligation 
and legitimate price to pay in return for public infrastructure and services.27 
 
One clear way to demonstrate the link between taxes and better service delivery is to hold 
public consultations on how the public want their money spent. It is then the government’s 
responsibility to actually deliver on its commitments, which is ultimately the best way to 
build trust and accountability over time. Concurrently, the government can also 
communicate how taxes have been spent on public priorities. The government could even 
solidify its communicated commitments by earmarking funds from its taxes for public 
priorities. As demonstrated by the example of Lagos in Case Study 4, more public 
participation and political communication can be an effective way in increasing tax 
compliance. 
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It may also help if municipalities can legitimise their communicated commitments.29 One 
option that Amman might consider would be to split the Compensation Charge into 
multiple fees that are directly related to tangible infrastructure; this would also support 
unbundling the charge overall and preventing overlap with other charges. For example, in 
many municipalities in the USA fees are earmarked in separated escrow accounts for 
public infrastructure, such as schools, roads, fire and rescue, parks, and sewerage, and 
cannot be spent on anything other than the proposed infrastructure they were assigned 
to. However, having a number of separate accounts will also increase the administration 
of the budgets and this may be a significant trade-off that GAM will have to consider 
carefully. 
 
Another approach would be to make much greater use of exactions, as noted in Case 
Study 2. As highlighted, property developers share the municipality’s costs related to 
public infrastructure and services that are needed to service areas of new developments. 
However, depending on how they are implemented, it may provide developers with more 
choice and control over the infrastructure, as the developers provide it in-kind themselves. 
Actually being able to tangibly see and coordinate how the tax translates into investment 
may provide additional incentives for developers to comply with their taxes. Furthermore, 
GAM may also think about how this can be better tied to other objectives such as equality. 
For example, for a developer who is thinking about high-end residential developments, 
GAM may request the in-kind contribution to be affordable housing in another area of the 
city – this type of policy has been implemented in other places, for instance, in Vancouver, 
Canada, through the community amenity contributions.30 Potential precedent for in-kind 
contributions are already in the 1966 Planning Law, which through Articles 56 and 57 allow 
for land owners to be compensated with other pieces of land, if their land had to be 
expropriated for public investments. 
 
Recouping the value from Amman’s levies and charges 
To improve Amman’s use of land value capture, first and foremost an assessment will 
need to be made about which taxes, levies or compensation fees, GAM will want to 
continue using. 
 
Although development and betterment levies are very clearly enshrined in current law, as 
summarised in Table 2, and could serve an important role in increasing GAM’s revenues, 
they are largely not implemented in practice. The choice to adopt compensations fees in 
their place has led to a confusing system in which one policy tool attempts to encapsulate 
various elements of several different value capture instruments, including betterment 
levies, development levies, and land value increment taxes. However, each of these 
Between 1999 and 2011, Lagos State’s revenues from state-level taxes increased five-fold to 
over USD1 billion. Capital spending increased from USD600 million in 2006 to USD1.7 billion 
in 2011. This represents a shift towards a higher tax, higher service delivery equilibrium. 
What’s more, Governor Fashola and his successor Tinubu were both successfully re-elected 
based on popular support for the tax and infrastructure reforms. 
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instruments has its own specific advantages which relate closely to the use-case in 
question and in particular whether the land value increases they are trying to capture have 
arisen from changes in policy or an investment in infrastructure. This lack of clarity is 
further exacerbated by the fact that the use of compensation fees is currently based on 
interpretation rather than actual stipulation of Jordanian law. 
 
Table 2: Amman’s Land value capture instruments discussed in this report 
 
Instrument Rationale 
Defined 
by 
Used in 
practice 
Main issues 
 
 
Development 
levy 
 
Cover capital expenses 
of public infrastructure 
investments. 
 
1966 
Planning 
Law 
 
 
No 
• Lack of distinction from betterment levies. 
• Charged to landowner rather than 
developer. 
• Rate based on land values rather than 
infrastructure. 
• Payments not required upfront. 
 
 
Betterment 
levy 
 
Recoup value created 
by public infrastructure 
investments. 
1966 
Planning 
Law & 
1987 
Expropria 
tion Law 
 
 
No 
• Stipulated in different ways in two different 
laws. 
• Weak capacity in calculating infrastructure 
costs limits accuracy of levy. 
• Applied tax rate currently not related to 
infrastructure costs. 
 
 
Compensation 
fee 
Fulfil roles of 
development and 
betterment levies via 
more easily 
implementable charge 
for so-called “extra 
development rights”. 
 
 
Not 
legally 
binding 
 
 
 
Yes 
• Based on interpretation rather than law. 
• Applied in place of LVIT, betterment levy, 
and development levy despite separate 
use-cases and requirements. 
• Weaknesses in implementation, target, 
timing, calculation and communication. 
 
This use of compensation fees stems from the fact that the necessary factors for 
calculating betterment and development levies are currently not well-documented in 
Amman and therefore the levies used to be widely contested. Hence, a suitable resolution 
for these levies would be to either (i) develop methods that allow for more accurate 
and transparent documentation of GAM’s investments and their links to land 
values; or (ii) to revise the calculations currently outlined in the 1966 Planning Law 
so that they can be based on other factors. These suggestions are potentially a more 
direct route to resolving the challenges of implementation and enforcement of levies which 
until now have been offset by the advent of the compensation fee. 
 
Another method of improving clarity in this context, irrespective of whether betterment or 
development levies are reinstated in practice, would be to clearly outline the 
compensation fee and its calculation methodology and payment protocols as part 
of new legislation. For any value capture instrument to be used effectively, it is critical 
that it is clearly defined by legislation which, at a minimum, addresses: the circumstances 
under which the instrument can and cannot be charged; a formula for calculating the 
amount of the fee; who the liable taxpayer is; proposed payment schedule; and how the 
money will be used by the government. 
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The potential advantage of defining legislation for the compensation fee is that it seems 
that for about the past 10 years, this fee has already been more successfully implemented 
and accepted than other levies; hence it may receive less push-back if it is officially 
enshrined. The drawback here would of course be that one fee would be covering a 
number of different purposes that in an ideal setting should be separated out and targeted 
at individuals for particular purposes at specific times, as outlined in the section on 
international experiences. 
 
If GAM decides to keep the compensation fee and outline it in the new law, the next 
consideration would be whether the current rate is appropriate; this too would then 
need to be documented as part of the new formulation of the 1966 Planning Law itself in 
order to make it transparent. To better target the compensation fee, as mentioned above, 
further considerations could be given to understand how and when the compensation fee 
is used and to differentiate its calculations to match the situation. The trade-off here is that 
it reduces the simplicity of calculation and therefore may increase the costs of calculation. 
 
Particularly in the case where the compensation fee is meant to recoup the cost of 
development (conventionally warranting a development levy), its calculation will need to 
be transparent and clear to developers to incentivise them to pay. Hence, different 
calculations that more closely reflect the cost of increased infrastructure and service needs 
of each area where developments are taking place may be necessary in all cases, i.e. 
whether betterment and development levies are reinstated or whether compensation fees 
are used in their place. Once the municipality have legitimate and widely accepted 
infrastructure plans that have already undergone cost appraisals, then they would have a 
much stronger grounding on which to justify charges, whether through a compensation 
fee or development levy. It is worth noting that this would also strengthen the legal case 
when dealing with contribution disputes, potentially avoiding large additional costs to the 
local government. Over time, as administration for the compensation fee or other charges 
became more proficient, one would expect these charges could be calculated precisely 
according to pre-defined criteria that can be adjusted and applied to any developer, in the 
cases where the charge is tied to new developments. It should be noted that, although not 
subject of this report, a well-functioning property tax system, based on market values, is 
another way that investment expenses can more clearly be linked to related increases in 
land values. 
 
Taking the step to improve legal and practical clarity around the charges outlined is 
an opportunity that will come with the revision on the law. This is clearly, as outlined by 
this report, an important foundation upon which GAM can build in order to improve the 
overall administration, issuance and collection of land and property taxes. Over time, such 
improvements could enhance the general efficiency of the tax system and strengthen the 
relationship between the state and the taxpayer as it becomes more straightforward to 
understand and comply with the formal system. Ultimately, these incremental steps will 
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help the city government to raise finances and support the sustainable growth of Amman 
through targeted public investments. 
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